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On the evening of January 18, 1991, just hours before the Allied Forces bombed
Baghdad, the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan (ROC) passed
the Fair Trade Law (FTL). Without doubt, the United Nations' sanctions against
Iraq were related to concerns about the Iraqi aggression's adverse impact on the
global crude oil supply. In a similar vein, passage of the FTL, which became
effective on February 4, 1992,' reflected the ROC legislators' concern regarding
the effect of monopolies, cartels, and market manipulation on the ROC's econ-
omy. Insofar as the Gulf War affected geopolitical balance and global economic
stability, so too will the enforcement of the FTL by the Fair Trade Commission
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Taipei Bar Association; J.D., University of Chicago; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania; LL.B.,
National Taiwan University. The author became an advisor to the Preparatory Office of the Fair Trade
Commission of the Executive Yuan of the ROC in 1991. The views expressed herein, however, are
those of the author alone.
1. Article 49 for the FTL provides for a one-year transition period before its effectiveness, so
that industries and the public could make the necessary adjustments. Fair Trade Law art. 49 (Jan.
18, 1991) in INTERNATIONAL ExECUTIVE REPORTs, LTD., Apr. 15, 1991, at B26 (LEXIS, Intlaw
library, Easiam file). Contracts awarded before the FTL came into force but are still performed after
February 4, 1992, will be subject to the FTL. Case 81-Kung-Chu-004, 1 FTC GAZETTE, no. 4, May
31, 1992, at 2 (predatory bid by offering nominal prices in 1991).
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(FTC) and the new competition rules and policy contained in the FTL have a
parallel far-reaching impact for Taiwan and international firms conducting busi-
ness there.2
Already the world's twenty-fifth largest economy and thirteenth ranked trading
nation, Taiwan has had one of the fastest growing "dragon economies" in Asia.
It recently embarked on a Six-Year National Development Plan (Six-Year Plan)
entailing infrastructure and other projects that will cost more than U.S. $300
billion. Despite uncertainty in reaching a rapprochement, or even unification,
with Mainland China, which still can be a military threat to the ROC, companies in
Taiwan have made substantial investments in China and inroads into its domestic
markets, fostering a subtle process of economic integration toward a Greater
China. Although it has always been prone to intervene in the economy, 3 Taiwan
epitomizes the Chinese entrepreneurial spirit.4 Moreover, after four decades of
impressive economic development, Taiwan is now clearly headed for liberaliza-
tion) This process has revealed a need for a competition law to ensure adequate
competition in the marketplace through antitrust measures and to contain overzea-
lous and unfair business practices through rules against unfair competition law. 6
This article describes in part I the salient features of the antitrust rules in the
FTL. Part II is devoted to the FTL's rules governing unfair competition. Part III
addresses remedies and enforcement under the FTL. The article concludes with
part IV, in which the author assesses the FTL's potential impact on the competi-
tiveness of the business environment and on firms, whether domestic or foreign,
doing business in Taiwan.
2. Proponents of a correlationship between the passage of competition laws and armed conflicts
would be vindicated. See Theodore P. Kovaleff, Preface to a Symposium on the 100th Anniversary of
the Sherman Act and Upon the 75th Anniversary of the Clayton Act, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 6 (1990),
in which he noted that the United States Clayton Act was enacted shortly before World War I.
3. WORLD L. COMPETITION (MB), Unit D, § 1.02 (Julian 0. Von Kalinowski, ed. 1986)
(contribution by Lawrence S. Liu) [hereinafter WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION.
4. See The Overseas Chinese: A Driving Force, THE ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 21.
5. For a discussion of recent economic developments in Taiwan, see, e.g., ROBERT WADE,
GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990); K.T. LI, THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY BEHIND TAIWAN'S DEVELOPMENT
SUCCESS (1988); BELA BALASSA & JOHN WILLIAMS, ADJUSTING TO SUCCESS: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
POLICY IN THE EAST ASIAN NICS (1990); JIMMY W. WHEELER & PERRY L. WOOD, BEYOND RECRIMI-
NATION, PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.TAIWAN TRADE TENSIONS (1987); Lawrence S. Liu, Legal andPolicy
Perspectives on United States Trade Initiatives and Economic Liberalization in the Republic of China,
11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 326 (1990). The historical background and substance of the FTL, therefore,
are vastly different from those of the competition laws in Central Eastern European countries. Compare
Russell Pittman, Some Critical Provisions in the Antimonopoly Laws of Central and Eastern Europe, 26
INT'L LAW. 485 (1992), with Lawrence S. Liu, Experimenting with Competition Law: A Preliminary
Analysis of the Draft Fair Trade Law of Taiwan, the Republic of China, 13 WORLD COMP. L. & EcON.
REV. 5 (1989).
6. Article 4 of the FTL defines competition to mean the act of soliciting business opportunities
by two or more enterprises in the market on the basis of better prices, quantities, quality services,
or other terms.
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I. Antitrust Rules
A. SCOPE AND SUPREMACY OF THE FTL
Article 1 of the FTL provides that where not set forth in the FTL, provisions
of other laws shall apply. This apparent boilerplate legislative language has fueled
debates since the FTL bill was drafted. Should the FTL be an economic Magna
Carta that takes precedence over other statutes regulating business and commerce?
This supremacy issue, thus far still unresolved, could determine the role of the
FTC, itself a new enforcement agency.
The FTL sets forth lofty goals: protection of consumer welfare, maintenance
of orderly market functions, fair competition, and facilitation of economic stabil-
ity and prosperity in the ROC.7 Unlike piecemeal competition statutes in other
countries, such as the United States, the FTL is more ambitious in scope. It
incorporates into one statute two major legal regimes: antitrust law' and unfair
competition law. 9 The antitrust provisions of the FTL, being more controversial,
have delayed its enactment, while the unfair competition provisions are perceived
to be much more urgently needed.'°
To this end a wide range of business practices have been made subject to
the FTL: monopolies, oligopolies, monopolization, combinations and mergers,
discriminatory treatment, horizontal concerted actions, vertical restraints, exclu-
sionary practices, pyramid sales programs, passing off, false advertising, and
other acts that may confuse consumers. The FTL also addresses trade libel,
misappropriation of trade secrets, and other deceptive and unfair practices that
prevent the market from functioning in an orderly manner. Generally, competition
in both goods and services is subject to the FTL.
Another salient feature of the FTL is that it defines enterprises and applies to
them primarily. Enterprises include companies, sole proprietorships, partner-
ships, trade associations, and other persons or groups engaged in transactions and
the sale of goods and services." Enterprises covered by this definition could
also include privately and publicly supported foundations (which are similar
to nonprofit, tax-exempt corporations in the United States) such as hospitals.
Incorporated government-owned enterprises certainly are within this definition.
Conceivably, government agencies should not be classified as enterprises. Indeed,
7. FTL art. 1.
8. Id. art. 10 through 19.
9. Id. art. 20 through 24.
10. For a discussion of the policy issues presented by the FTL bill, see Economic Committee,
Legislative Yuan, SHEN TSA KUNG PING CHIAO Yi FA TSAN KAO TSE LIAO [REFERENCE MATERIALS
REGARDING THE REVIEW OF THE DRAFT FAIR TRADE LAW] [hereinafter REFERENCE MATERIALS]. It
has even been suggested that the pressure of the United States Government and the threat of retaliation
under the Trade Act of 1974 account in part for the need to enact the FTL. See Trade Act of 1974
§ 301, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)). See, e.g., Remarks of Legislator
Wen-Yung Chou, REFERENCE MATERIALS, at 32, 33.
11. FTL art. 2.
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the FTC has taken the position that, while taking action pursuant to public laws,
an agency is not an enterprise. Arguably, however, an inference can be drawn
that where an agency engages in activities not pursuant to public laws (such as
private transactions), it could constitute an enterprise under the FTL.12
A provision of the first draft of the Enforcement Rules 13 provided that where
either an act in violation of the FTL or its effect occurs in the ROC, the FTL shall
apply. Although now removed from the final Enforcement Rules, this concept
is consistent with the ROC's existing position on asserting legal jurisdiction.14
Accordingly, the FTL could very well apply to foreign enterprises that do not
maintain a permanent business establishment in Taiwan. Where they maintain a
branch in Taiwan, they will certainly be subject to the FTL."5 In light of the
substantial foreign investment in Taiwan and its important role in international
trade, extraterritorial application of the FTL to nonresident companies and appli-
cation otherwise to foreign-owned companies located in Taiwan should be moni-
tored closely by international practitioners.
B. EXEMPTIONS FROM THE FTL
Falling within the FTL's definition of enterprise only begins the analysis. The
FTL also provides for three statutory exemptions. First, it recognizes that patents,
trademarks, and copyright are legal monopolies granted by the government. As
such, a proper exercise of such rights pursuant to the Trademark Law, Copyright
Law, or the Patent Law will not violate the FTL. 16 However, what the FTC and
the courts will perceive as reasonable and proper is unclear. This uncertainty may
invite controversy. 7
Second, article 46(1) of the FTL exempts activities otherwise in violation of
the FTL if they are authorized by law, which literally means statutes enacted by
the Legislative Yuan. The FTL offers no clear guidance on what other regulated
activities will be exempt from the FTL.' 8 In view of the popularity of "administra-
tive guidance" or "moral suasion" in Taiwan, controversies have arisen. Thus
12. Interpretation Kung-Yen-O01, 1 FTC GAZETTE, no. 4, May 31, 1992, at 4.
13. FTL art. 48 authorizes the FTC to adopt these Enforcement Rules, a practice different from
that in, say, the United States and Europe but similar to that in Japan.
14. See Criminal Code art. 3 which follows the same principle.
15. The FTC has informally taken the position that ROC branches of two merging foreign
enterprises will be subject to the premerger review rules under the FTL. Speech by Vice Chairman
Y-Nan Liao of the FTC, at Lee and Li, Taipei, Taiwan (June 4, 1992).
16. FTL art. 45.
17. Taiwan's Patent Law already prohibits tying arrangements. In addition, commentators have
argued that trademark licensing could not be designed to restrict markets. Moreover, in negotiations
with American film companies in June 1992, Taiwanese owners of MTV business have argued that
collective bargaining by American companies for copyright licenses would violate the anticartel
provisions of the FTL.
18. Cf. the practice in Germany, where specific sectoral exemptions are set forth in its competition
statute, and that in the United States, where exemptions are set forth in other federal statutes but can
be created by judicial pronouncements as well.
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far, decisions or regulations of agencies that may not be clearly authorized by
a statute have permitted business conduct not in conformity with competition
rules. 19
More importantly, article 46(2) of the FTL further exempts activities by public
utilities, government-owned enterprises, and transportation enterprises, if they
are approved by the Executive Yuan, for up to five years from its promulgation.2 °
The government enterprise exemption is particularly controversial since the pri-
vate sector argues that the FTL does not treat them with an even hand.21 In
addition, the public utilities and transportation enterprise exemptions also overlap
in part with the exemption under article 46(1) of the FTL, further complicating
the interpretation of these exemptions.
C. MONOPOLIES, OLIGOPOLIES, AND MONOPOLIZATION
Rightly or not, the primary concern of the FTL is monopolies. Following a de
facto structural approach, it nominally defines a monopoly as a condition wherein
an enterprise does not face competition or has such a superior market power as
to exclude competition in a particular market defined in terms of both the relevant
product or service and the relevant geographical area.22 Significantly, the FTL
also applies to oligopolies, defined as a condition wherein two or more firms do
not engage in price competition among themselves and collectively constitute
monopolies. 23 The FTL contains this progressive provision because the govern-
ment perceives many sectors of the economy in Taiwan to be quite centralized.24
Also, in a civil law jurisdiction, like Taiwan, which lacks discovery proceedings,
collusive agreements are harder to prove.25
The mere possession of monopoly power is not in and of itself objectionable.
19. Soon after the FTL took effect, a lawyer in Taiwan filed a petition with the FTC for a test
case on the legality of securities brokerage commissions. The FTC finally took the position that such
rates were authorized by a specific provision in article 85 of the Securities and Exchange Law.
However, the FTC states that it still was not pleased with this exemption, and suggested that the fixed
rates be removed. FTC, PRESS RELEASE (Mar. 28, 1992). An ongoing study by a group of scholars
led by this author found that business activities permitted by more than 300 regulations of other
agencies could be challenged under the FTL.
20. Such activities, if approved, will be exempt until Feb. 4, 1996. FTL art. 46(2).
21. As a result, the Executive Yuan has been very conservative in reviewing a pending application
by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) on behalf of government-owned companies regulated
by it for exemption of more than twenty specific types of business activities.
22. FTL art. 5(1), 5(3).
23. Id. art. 5(2). It reflects the government's perception that many oligopolistic enterprises in
Taiwan have engaged in tacit anticompetitive acts by "conscious parallelism" or "price leadership."
24. This provision is also influenced by the structural approach in article 22 of the German Act
against Restraints of Competition [Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbeschriinkungen]. Act Against Restraints
of Competition, HGB, § 22 (1990) (Ger.).
25. Compare the interdependence theory of oligopoly pricing, as suggested by Donald F. Turner,
The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal,
75 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962), with RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEC-
TIVE 39-77 (1976).
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However, unlike other national or regional competition rules, the FTL requires
the FTC to regularly publish a list of monopolies and oligopolies.26 Although
generally acknowledged to be unnecessary and perhaps harmful to effective en-
forcement, the unique requirement of predetermining the existence and extent of
monopoly power without regard to whether there is any actual or alleged conduct
of monopolization now becomes an important issue. Stakes are high for the FTC
and businesses alike. Practical concerns include the strains on limited resources
of the FTC to conduct thorough investigations, its strength and credibility to
ensure that such findings will survive legal and political challenges, big business's
concern with the stigma effect of being labeled a monopolist in Taiwan, and
anticompetitive allegations by lesser competitors that may ensue.
The Enforcement Rules attempt to address these difficult issues. In prede-
termining which are monopolies, these Rules require the FTC to examine five
factors: market shares in the relevant market,27 substitutability from both timing
and geographical perspectives, the ability of an enterprise to influence prices,
entry barriers to other enterprises, and conditions of imports and exports. 2 More
importantly, the Enforcement Rules set forth nonbinding "safe harbor rules" or
thresholds. 29 Generally, a monopoly or oligopoly will not exist unless an aggregate
market share test is met, and either an individual market share test or an individual
revenue test is also met. The individual market share test requires at least that:
(1) an enterprise (in the case of single-firm domination) has a 50 percent share
in the relevant market: (2) two enterprises jointly have a two-third share in such
market; or (3) three enterprises jointly have a three-fourth share in such market.
Each such enterprise should also have at least a 10 percent share in such market
or more than NT $1 billion of revenues for the preceding fiscal year.
Even when these general tests are not met, firms could still constitute monopo-
lies or oligopolies under special circumstances. For example, entry barriers to
the provision of goods or services created by law or technology could exist. The
Enforcement Rules also suggest that other factors may enable existing firms to
influence supply and demand in the relevant market and exclude competition. 0
Therefore, the FTL could be a powerful tool to force liberalization in traditionally
restrictive markets. s
The FTL prohibits a monopolistic enterprise from unfairly excluding others
from the market, maintaining or modifying prices unjustifiably, requesting fa-
26. FTL art. 10 ("Monopoly enterprises shall be announced by the competent authority.").
27. A market share analysis should be based on the production, sales, inventory, import, and
export volumes of the enterprise and for all firms in the relevant market. This analysis should be based
on information obtained from the FTC's investigations and records of other Board of Foreign Trade
of the MOEA. See Enforcement Rules art. 5.
28. Id. art. 3.
29. Id. arts. 4(1), 4(2).
30. Id. art. 4(3).
31. The FTC has hinted that, by a preliminary estimate, approximately 131 firms in Taiwan could
be listed as monopolies under the criteria set forth in the Enforcement Rules. Liao, supra note 15.
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vored treatment unjustifiably, and otherwise abusing its dominant market posi-
tion.32 Oligopolies, which are treated as a form of monopolies, will be subject to
the same prohibition. Because the FTL is more similar to article 86 of the Treaty
of Rome33 than to section 2 of the U.S. Sherman Antitrust Act,34 European experi-
ence of how these prohibitions will be interpreted may be more useful. 35 Conceiv-
ably, both predatory pricing and monopolistic pricing may constitute an act of
monopolization. With reduced tariffs but higher retail prices and cost of living,
both dumping and exorbitant prices have raised public concerns in recent years.
Buying power is also suspect under this provision insofar as a powerful buyer
could exact unjustifiably favorable treatment. The FTL's legislative history
clearly shows a strong public concern with monopsonies. Exclusionary practices
that are anticompetitive are prohibited as well. This prohibition could force firms
with substantial market power to drastically modify their distribution arrange-
ments. Nonetheless, whether and how an economic analysis of the social cost and
benefit of an exclusionary practice by market dominant firms will be made is
unclear.36 Particularly troubling is the amorphous concept of "abuse of dominant
market position." 37 Guidance on its meaning could be sought from comparable
concepts in European competition laws. However, until the enactment of the FTL,
an abuse of right, however reprehensible, has never constituted a criminal offense
or created administrative liabilities in the ROC.
While global competition may demand that companies in Taiwan be more
scale-efficient, the FTL's sanctions reveal a strong contrary legislative intent to
control big firms in Taiwan. A maximum three-year imprisonment or a criminal
fine of up to NT $1 million, or both, may be imposed for violating these provi-
sions.3" Compared with the United States' sentencing guidelines for Sherman
Act 39 violations, imprisonment and monetary penalties under the FTL seem to be
vastly disproportionate. Moreover, a violation could also lead to administrative
sanctions and civil liabilities. n° The severity of these sanctions also sharply con-
trasts with the uncertainty in determining what constitutes monopolization or
oligopolization, as these FTL provisions typically follow standards such as "un-
fair methods" 4' and "without proper reason.' 42 As a result, the control of monop-
32. FTL arts. 10(1), 10(2), 10(3).
33. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [also
known as the Treaty of Rome].
34. Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 299 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
35. Joel Davidow, The Worldwide Influence of U.S. Antitrust, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 603 (1990).
36. Cf. article 24 of the Enforcement Rules, supra note 27, which mentions some factors in
reviewing the legality of vertical arrangements in general.
37. Article 148 of the Civil Code also prohibits, as a civil matter, abusive exercise of rights.
38. FTL art. 35.
39. Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2).
40. Id. arts. 30, 31, 32, 41. The administrative fines could be imposed consecutively, and the
maximum of such fines imposed each time is also NT $1 million.
41. FTL art. 10(1).
42. FTL art. 10(3).
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olies may become very controversial, with frequent clashes between the FTL and
Taiwan's industrial policies.
While grappling with these thorny issues, regulators, prosecutors, litigants,
and courts in the ROC inevitably will all have to look to foreign antitrust and
unfair competition laws for guidance. For example, market power analysis is thus
far unknown to lawyers traditionally trained in Taiwan. Even economists are not
necessarily well versed in industrial organization in Taiwan.43 Because of the
unique requirement in the FTL to publish and update a list of monopolies and
oligopolies without regard to whether any actual anticompetitive conduct exists,
the need for this analysis takes on more significance. 44
D. MERGER CONTROL
The FTL is not only concerned with monopolization, it also seeks to control
monopolies at their inception. Accordingly, it authorizes the FTC to review
a merger and similar forms of economic integration by requiring premerger
notification and approval. A combination under the FTL could take any one of
the following legal forms:
(1) mergers;
(2) holdings or acquisitions of more than one-third of the voting stock or capital
of another enterprise;
(3) a transfer or lease of all or a majority of an enterprise's business or property;
(4) frequent joint operations with other enterprises or operating another enter-
prise at its request; or
(5) the exercise of direct or indirect control over the personnel of another
45
enterprise.
This legal approach notwithstanding, the FTC and commentators generally
agree that from an economic perspective, combinations can be classified into
horizontal combinations among competitors, vertical combinations to integrate
operations, and conglomerate combinations. However, how the legal definitions
43. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 937 (1981).
44. A case in point is that, according to one prior study, ten industries in Taiwan had a market
concentration rate of more than 90 percent. See Fung-Hsiang Hsaio, Determination and Analysis of
Market Concentration in the ROC, 13 MONTHLY J. TAIPEI BANK 43 (1981) (cited in WORLD LAW
OF COMPETITION, supra note 3, § 2.0213], at n.30). Pursuant to an unpublished memorandum of
Taiwan's Price Surveillance Council, a former agency under the MOEA which is now merged into
the FTC, enterprises that possibly had engaged in anticompetitive practices include the producers of
PVC powder, PE plastics, and certain consumer products. Id. n.34. The result of many such studies,
however, was not derived from a rigorous market analysis, and may have confused, for example,
domestic output with total market demand. Failure to consider actual or potential import also reduces
their usefulness.
45. FTL art. 6. An attribution rule applies where an enterprise group holds or acquires shares
in another enterprise, so that all holdings will be aggregated. Id. art. 6(5).
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of combinations will be interpreted in the context of economic integration remains
to be seen.46
Intended to capture only sizeable, market-sensitive economic integration, the
FTL sets up certain thresholds to determine what combinations require the scru-
tiny of the FTC:
(1) where the combined enterprise will enjoy one-third of the market;
(2) where one of the constituent enterprises to a combination has one-fourth
of the market shares; or
(3) where the sales of one of the constituent enterprises to a combination
for the previous accounting year exceeded the minimum sales amount
(presently, NT $2 billion47) published by the FTC. 48
Failure to obtain the FTC's prior approval to a reportable combination may
result in divestiture, compulsory disposition of assets, cessation of business, and
administrative fines. 49 Accordingly, although the FTC does not have structural
remedies for dealing with monopolization, it may unwind combinations that tend
to create monopolies. Prudent firms, therefore, may be motivated to file for its
approval when the applicability of the FTL is in doubt.50 In its review the FTC
has to determine the legality of a combination under a cost-benefit analysis. If the
advantages of such a combination to the national economy as a whole outweigh
the disadvantages arising from restricted competition, the combination may never-
theless be approved.5 Potential benefits such as economy of scale, reduction of
production cost, and rationalization of management are recognized by the FTL's
46. For example, it is unclear whether a merger of a wholly owned subsidiary into its patent
company will be subject to the FTL. Similarly, it is unclear whether the "holdings" test (which
suggests a particular condition, as opposed to "acquisitions" which suggests a specific action) will
apply to holdings that already exceeded one-third when the FTL became effective. The same issue
also exists for an enterprise that already controlled another enterprise before the FTL's passage.
47. Publication 81-Kun-Fa-Mi-012, 1 FTC GAZETTE, no. 3, Apr. 30, 1992, at 1.
48. FTL art. 11(1). To alert enterprises that may be subject to merger review, the FTC is further
required to publish and maintain a list of enterprises having a minimum 20 percent market share. Id.
The sales threshold offers more certainty than the market share threshold test. Although enterprises
proposing to combine may try to follow the market analysis prescribed under monopoly control
provisions of the FTL and the Enforcement Rules, the difficulties inherent in this process could lead
to miscalculations.
49. Id. arts. 13, 40. The requirement for a definitive approval distinguishes the FTL's merger
review provisions from those under the American Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act,
under which failure to act by the enforcement agencies constitutes a de facto approval. 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a(a).
50. The Enforcement Rules impose unilateral or joint filing obligations based on the different
legal definitions of combinations. Information to be filed includes sales amount, business report, and
financial statements of all affiliated enterprises for the prior fiscal year; number of employees at each
constituent enterprise, production, or operating cost; selling price and the unit value of the relevant
goods or services sold; and a description of the positive economic effect of the proposed combination.
A one-time supplemental filing may be made, which will toll the two-month deadline for a disposition
by the FTC. Where necessary, the government may publish its approval of such combinations.
Enforcement Rules, supra note 27, arts. 7, 8, 9, 10.
51. Id. art. 12.
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legislative history. However, many practical issues still require further clarifica-
tion by the FTC. 52 Even at the policy level, the FTL's merger review provisions
present important issues. The FTC, for example, needs to reconcile its policies
with the traditionally mercantilistic industrial policies of the ROC, which, fa-
voring scale economy, .encourage Taiwan firms to compete globally. The more
consideration is given to competitive pressures from abroad, the more such a
review seems to differ from the market analysis used to determine monopolies. 3
E. HORIZONTAL CONCERTED ACTIONS
Although the FTL is nominally more concerned with monopolies, enforcement
efforts since its enactment have focused on cartels, or concerted actions among
enterprises. a A concerted action requires some agreement, contract, or other
form of coordination of intent and is necessarily consensual.5 5 It means a hori-
zontal action among firms at the same level of production or sale that may affect
how supply and demand for the relevant goods or services interact in the market. 
5 6
The FTL establishes a general principle that enterprises in competition with
each other may not engage in concerted actions to restrict prices, quantities,
customers, territories, or otherwise restrict each other's commercial activities.57
Enterprises engaged in such cartels may be subject to a maximum three-year
imprisonment and both criminal and administrative fines and may incur civil
liabilities. 5' This prohibition, however, follows the American per se rule only
nominally. Following the model of Germany's and the European Community's
52. For example, it is unclear whether adverse social and political consequences (such as plant
closure and layoff of redundant employees) should come into the economic cost-benefit calculus. It
is also unclear how the NT $2 billion sales threshold will apply, and the FTC has hinted that foreign
firms with branches in Taiwan that have such sales should apply insofar as their branch operations
will be combined, despite that both enterprises are foreign entities. See Liao, supra note 15.
53. An indication of such a dichotomy is the inconsistent threshold requirements for monopolies
and combinations in the Enforcement Rules. Although a general sales volume test of NT $1 billion
was used for examining monopolies, the FTC failed to adhere to this logic in that it relaxed the
threshold for combinations; the NT $2 billion sales threshold for requiring combinations to be approved
is twice as high as the threshold for monopolies.
54. This is in part because the list of monopolies has not been published. But there is also a strong
belief that cartels are very popular; some of them have even been formed with the government's
encouragement or acquiescence through "administrative guidance" or "moral suasion."
55. Enforcement Rules, supra note 27, art. 2(2). However, it is not settled how joint ventures
will be treated. Conceivably, large-size joint ventures could be subject to rules governing both
horizontal concerted actions and combinations.
56. Id. art. 2(1). This definition seems to add a "de minimis" exception to concerted actions
among competitors. It therefore could exclude from antitrust scrutiny cartels among competitors not
having adequate market power.
57. FTL art. 14(1).
58. Id. arts. 30, 31, 32, 35, 41.
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competition laws, the FTL also establishes seven specific exceptions whereby
such cartels could nevertheless be legalized.59
As a general condition to legalizing cartels, the FTC has to find that such cartel
arrangements are "beneficial to the national economy or public interest as a
whole. -60 A showing by enterprises that their agreements or joint arrangements
are procompetitive is insufficient. 61 Such agreements and arrangements not only
have to be jointly notified in advance by such enterprises or their trade associa-
tion,62 but a definitive approval by the FTC is also required. To this extent, this
FTL requirement is different from the European models that have developed
practices to permit block exemptions and negative clearances. The FTC may also
impose conditions and require modifications as a condition of its approval. An
approved concerted action will be valid for up to three years. When good cause
is shown, such approvals may be extended for terms not exceeding three years.63
The seven exceptions, each of which smacks of a rule-of-reason analysis, are:
(1) standardization cartels, that is, product or model standardization in order
to reduce cost, improve quality, or enhance efficiency; 64
(2) research or marketing cartels, that is, joint research and development or
joint market development to upgrade technology, improve quality, reduce
cost, or enhance efficiency;
65
(3) specialization cartels, that is, agreements to engage in separate specializa-
tions to facilitate rationalization by enterprises; 66
59. Note, however, an empirical research that showed costs increased after cartels were legalized
in West Germany. DAVID AUSDRETSCH, THE EFFECT OF LEGALIZED CARTELS IN WEST GERMANY
(1987) (cited in DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
745 (1990)).
60. FTL art. 14.
61. To this extent, this FTL requirement is different from the prevalent American treatment of
agreements among competitors. The legality of such actions is typically challenged in a public or
private enforcement proceeding, whereas request for advisory opinions through the United States
Department of Justice's business review process is still relatively rare.
62. Enforcement Rules, supra note 27, art. 11. An application should disclose, for example,
the nature, term, and applicable location of such concerted actions; agreement or other documents
contemplating such joint actions; the substance of such actions and proposed method for implementa-
tion; each participating firm's revenues, financial statements, and business reports for the prior fiscal
year; and quarterly sales and production and pricing data concerning the relevant goods or services
for two years. In addition, they should provide a self-analysis describing the cost structure before and
after such proposed joint actions; the proposed cartel's impact on enterprises not participating in such
actions, impact on market structure, supply, demand, and prices; impact on upstream and downstream
industries and their markets; benefit or adverse consequences to the economy as a whole; and public
interest. Id. arts. 12, 13.
63. FTL art. 15. Whether such approvals will become perpetual shields from market competition
through extensions remains to be seen.
64. The application should state how these efficiencies could be obtained. Enforcement Rules,
supra note 27, art. 14.
65. The application should demonstrate cost savings in such activities and specify how these
efficiencies could be obtained. Id. art. 15.
66. The application should state how these efficiencies could be obtained. Id. art. 14.
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(4) export cartels, that is, agreements limited to foreign markets in order to
ensure or facilitate export;
67
(5) import cartels, that is, joint importation of foreign goods in order to im-
prove the effect of trade;
68
(6) recession cartels, that is, joint restriction of output, sales, equipment, or
prices pursuant to a plan to meet demands during an economic recession
when market prices for goods are lower than average production cost and
enterprises in that industry experience difficulty in surviving or excess
production; 69 and
(7) small business cartels, that is, joint actions taken to improve operating
efficiency of small and medium enterprises or enhance their competitive-
ness.
70
These seven exceptions indicate that they are not necessarily guided by eco-
nomic considerations alone. For example, in June 1992 the FTC approved a
grains import cartel, previously organized by the government in part to balance
U.S.-Taiwan trade, to continue until the end of 1993. In addition, the seven
exceptions are exclusive and, therefore, rigid. However, the definition of con-
certed action is open-ended. Justifiable joint business activities may nevertheless
constitute illegal concerted actions if they do not fall into any of the seven excep-
tions. This is in part because, at the end of the legislative process, the seventh
exception was changed from a catchall exception to one for small businesses only.
A case in point is the legality of joint construction bids. A popular practice that
is sometimes even required by agencies awarding infrastructure construction
projects encompassed by Taiwan's massive Six-Year Plan, joint construction bids
could be supported by procompetitive considerations, but may not fit into any of
the seven exceptions. As a result, the FTC is in the process of drafting guidelines
to screen these bids.
These seven exceptions will render the FTC a potentially important agency as
it could sit in judgment on the industrial policies of other agencies. Interest groups
may be tempted to treat the FTC as just another regulator that they are prone to
67. The application should also state the ratio of such participating enterprises' export to the total
export in the most recent year and analyze how export can be enhanced. Id. art. 16.
68. The application should state the participating firms' import for the last three years and the
cost savings from joint importation and should explain what specific impact may follow such joint
actions. Id. art. 17. The filing should include comparative data on average production cost and prices,
capacity, utility ratio, sales, production, import and export value, and volume; inventory for the last
three years; change in the number of firms in the relevant industry over the last three years; market
outlook; and remedial measures taken at such firms' own initiatives. Id. art. 18.
69. Id. art. 19.
70. See George J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. 3 (1971); Richard
A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 22 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Theories of
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcON. 335 (1974); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory
of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211 (1976); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. EON. 371 (1983).
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capture." As indicated by the grains import cartel case, what was once accepted
or encouraged by the government is now suspect and, unless exempt from the
FTL, will eventually come under the FTC's scrutiny. For its part the FTC has
adopted a cautious, case-by-case approach, at least initially. Since the decisions
of the FTC will have to be published in government gazettes, 72 a body of adminis-
trative precedents will become apparent and available as the FTC builds up its
expertise in dealing with cartels.
F. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES
The FTL also regulates vertical and exclusionary arrangements. It will nullify
resale price maintenance (RPM) unless daily consumption goods are involved that
may be readily substituted in the marketplace through "fee competition." 73 These
consumer goods are to be published, and the FTC has hinted that the list of goods
that can be subject to an RPM will be short. On the other hand, the FTC has also
taken the position that, in the case of an agency or consignment sale, an RPM will
be permitted because, legally speaking, no resale of goods occurs.4 The FTC has
also indicated that nonbinding resale price suggestions should be acceptable.
Enforcement of the rule nullifying RPMs can be straighforward because of
its simplicity. Since the FTL came into force many firms, in response, have
renegotiated with their resale dealers to remove the RPM arrangement. The FTL,
however, does not criminalize a violation of this rule, which as stated only nullifies
an agreement to the contrary. Thus, this treatment perhaps reflects an awareness
that RPM is a very controversial issue in antitrust law in certain countries such
as the United States. Still, in recent enforcement actions the FTC has hinted that
it could assess administrative fines on enterprises for a violation of this rule. 75
The FTL also prohibits an enterprise from engaging in any of the following
conduct if it constitutes a threat to fair competition. 76 A violation of this provision
is punishable by two years' imprisonment or criminal fines, or both.77 However,
criminal liability can attach only when the enterprise alleged to be in violation has
failed to comply with a cease-and-desist order of the FTC.7 The same rule applies
to an enforcement action by the FTC to seek administrative fines.79
71. FTL art. 17.
72. Id. art. 18.
73. FTC, PRESS RELEASE (Apr. 22, 1991).
74. FTL art. 41. Therefore, this position is tantamount to criminalizirig the rule nullifying the
RPMs.
75. Id. art. 19. As the following discussion will bear out, "unfair competition" in this provision
is used to describe primarily what are understood to be vertical restraints and exclusionary arrange-
ments in the United States.
76. Id. art. 36.
77. Id. In recent enforcement actions, the FTC has provided for deadlines as short as ten days
for compliance with this injunctive order.
78. Id. art. 41.
79. Id. art. 19(1).
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The first prohibition under this rule relates to inducement to boycott or refusal
to deal.8° Specifically, an enterprise may not, acting with the purpose of injuring
another enterprise, cause another enterprise to terminate other enterprises' sup-
plies, purchases, or other transactions. Even though this prohibition may parallel
the general rule against concerted actions such as collective boycott, arguably no
actual agreement to this effect is needed; solicitation alone is sufficient.
Second, unreasonable discrimination also constitutes a violation.8' Specifically,
this provision prohibits not only unreasonable price discrimination, but also
nonprice discrimination. Unlike the U.S. Robinson-Patman Act, 2 discrimination
in rendering services can be illegal as well. Conceivably, discrimination should
be found by comparing goods or services of like quality. Cost differential, volume,
credit risks, and market conditions (such as the need to meet competition) may
constitute reasonable defenses. In any event, the breadth of this rule could force
enterprises to justify their various business arrangements with different customers
from time to time.
Third, an enterprise may not induce customers of its competitors to transact
business with it through duress or improper business ethics, such as commercial
kickbacks.83 Its vagueness could prevent rigorous competition. A controversy in
point is the impact of the rule against improper enticement on promotional cam-
paigns such as offering gift items, prizes, or lotteries.84 The FTC is in the process
of developing guidelines to control such promotional activities. In addition, a
predatory low bid by an enterprise without sufficient market power may also
constitute a violation. 5
Fourth, an enterprise may not employ coercion, bribery, or other improper
means to cause other enterprises to refrain from price competition or participate in
combinations or concerted actions.86 Therefore, this rule could apply to situations
where only a solicitation or attempt to jointly engage in anticompetition conduct
is evidenced. 7
Fifth, an enterprise may not employ coercion, bribery, or other improper
means to obtain confidential information of other enterprises relating to sales,
production, customers, or technology.8 8 Although well-intended and much
needed, this rule against misappropriation of trade secrets is fatally flawed insofar
80. Id. art. 19(2).
81. Enforcement Rules, supra note 27, art. 23.
82. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 13a & 13b).
83. FTL art. 19(3).
84. The FTC has taken the position that giving away prizes can constitute a violation of article
19(3) of the FTL. Interpretation Kung-yen-005, 1 FTC GAZETTE, no. 4, May 31, 1992, at 8.
85. Case 81-Kung-Chu-004, 1 FTC GAZETTE, no. 4, May 31, 1992, at 1.
86. FTL art. 19(4); Case 81-Kung-Chu-003, 1 FTC GAZETTE, no. 3, Apr. 30, 1992, at 3.
87. In enforcement actions against gravel firms which threatened to restrict output in May 1992,
the FTC actually followed this strategy.
88. FTL art. 19(5).
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as criminal enforcement is concerned. The cease-and-desist requirement essen-
tially permits a culprit to relent, thereby making it extremely difficult to establish
a prima facie violation. The misplacement of this requirement in article 19(5) has
literally taken the teeth out of an otherwise well-crafted inhibition.
Sixth and foremost, an enterprise may not use improper restrictions on the
business activities of its counterparties as a condition for dealing with them. 89
Restrictions could take such forms as tying, exclusive dealing, territorial restraint,
and customer or usage restrictions .90 One of the most succinct provisions of the
FTL, this rule nevertheless promises to have a far-reaching and profound impact
in Taiwan as it affects virtually all types of nonprice vertical restraints. Clearly,
a "rule of reason" analysis is called for. The legality of a challenged transaction
will depend on factors such as the intent, purpose, and market position of the
parties, market structure, nature of products or services, and the competitive
impact of implementing such restrictions in the relevant market. 9' For firms with
sufficient market power to be listed as a monopolist or oligopolist, this analysis
offers standards of legality that are somewhat more concrete than those governing
the antimonopolization rules in article 10 of the FTL. To be sure, a case-by-case
approach will be followed as the FTC and practitioners develop their expertise
in interbrand and intrabrand market analysis.92
Unlike the case of a horizontal arrangement, the FTL does not authorize the
FTC to evaluate such vertical restraints and exclusionary practices in advance
through an application by the enterprises concerned. Although a request for
interpretation is possible, the FTC's recent responses do not offer much guid-
ance. 93 Still, a consensus exists in Taiwan that horizontal arrangements are more
likely to have an anticompetitive effect; whereas (at least nonprice) vertical ar-
rangements would not present as much anticompetitive risk. The FTC will do
well to concentrate on economic, rather than political or social, considerations
in its scrutiny of these practices.
II. Unfair Competition
A. PASSING OFF
The FTL's unfair competition provisions are generally much less controversial
than its antitrust provisions. At the heart of these provisions, which seek to prevent
89. Id. art. 19(6).
90. Enforcement Rules, supra note 27, art. 24(1). However, it does not apply to RPM, which
is subject to the nullification rules under article 18 of the FTL.
91. Id. art. 24(2). The FTC has taken the position that restrictions imposed in connection with
agency sales would not violate the FTL. FTC, PRESS RELEASE (Apr. 22, 1992).
92. Cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
93. On the other hand, there has been mounting political pressure since mid-1992 for the FTC
to take enforcement actions against high-priced consumer products. As a result, exclusive distributor-
ships have come under closer scrutiny.
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misappropriation of commercial goodwill, confusion of consumers, and other
unfair methods of competition, is the rule against passing off. Although the
Trademark Law, Patent Law, and Copyright Law in the ROC have all been
amended to expand the scope of protection and increase civil and criminal liabili-
ties, 94 legal protection of commercial goodwill would not be complete without
unfair competition law." Added to the draft version of the FTL in the mid-1980s
at the request of Taiwan's trading partners, this provision fills the void. It prohibits
the misuse of names, business names, corporate names, trademarks, service
marks, packaging, containers, appearance, or other commercial symbols of others
that are known to the relevant public. The use of a commercial symbol that is
identical or similar to the commercial symbol of others constitutes an act of unfair
competition. A use also includes a sale, transportation, import, and export of
goods or services identifying such symbol. Misuse of famous foreign trademarks,
even though they are not registered, will also constitute a violation.
96
One potential problem with the passing-off provision of the FTL is that the text
seems to require actual, rather than possible, confusion by members of the relevant
public. This distinction could make significant difference in enforcement actions,
as it affects the burden and level of proof. Another potential problem with this
provision is how its broad protection will affect other laws such as the Trademark
Law. The rule against passing off grants broad protection to trademarks as well.
In the ROC, however, under the current Trademark Law, which trademark takes
precedence will require a careful analysis. A practical example is a person racing
to the National Bureau of Standards of the MOEA to register a trademark that is
beneficially owned by another person, whether through good faith prior use or
registration of the trademark abroad. Since Taiwan follows the absolute priority-
of-registration rule, and instances mentioned above do occur from time to time,
resolution of this important issue will require a careful balancing of the policies
behind these two laws.97
94. Lawrence S. Liu, Legal and Policy Perspectives on United States Trade Initiatives and
Economic Liberalization in the Republic of China, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 326, 345-50 (1990).
95. Before the enactment of the FTL, there had been some similar cases which proceeded on the
basis of a business tort in violation of article 184 of the Civil Code. In recent years, Taiwan courts
have come to hold that passing off can constitute such a violation.
96. FTL art. 20. There are several exemptions to this prohibition, such as generic use of a term
for goods or services that is customary in the trade or industry, use of a person's own name, and good
faith use of a symbol before it becomes known to the general public, whether by the original user
or by someone who continues with such use through taking over the business of the original user.
Id. art. 20(1)-(3). A violation of article 20 is punishable by imprisonment up to three years and/or
a criminal fine up to NT $1 million. An administrative fine up to NT $1 million may be assessed
consecutively if the FTC's cease-and-desist order is not complied with. Id. arts. 35, 41.
97. The FTL provides for justifiable use of trademark rights as an exemption from it, and it has
been suggested that this constitutes sufficient authority for the Trademark Law to take precedence.
However, when not specifically provided in the FTL, other laws will apply. Id. art. 45.
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B. FALSE ADVERTISING AND SIMILAR COMMUNICATION
Under the FTL an enterprise may not make, on goods themselves or in any
advertising, any false or misleading representation that is likely to cause
confusion or mistake by consumers as to relevant information such as the
goods' price, quantity, quality, content, manufacturing process, manufacturing
date or place, expiration date, method of use, purpose, place of origin,
manufacturer, processor, and place of processing. A sale, transportation,
export, or import of such goods is also prohibited. In addition, where relevant,
this rule also applies to the provision of services.98 Advertising agencies and
the media on which such advertisement appears will be jointly and severally
liable if they know or should have known the false or misleading nature of
such communication with consumers. 99 On February 12, 1992, the FTC issued
its first cease-and-desist order against organizers of an auto show who engaged
in mispresentation to the public, thereby commencing an active enforcement
program in this area.100
C. TRADE LIBEL
Also added to the draft version of the FTL as a result of U.S.-Taiwan trade
talks in the mid-1980s is the rule against trade libel. An enterprise may not, for
the purpose of competing with others, make or publicize any false statement that
is likely to injure another person's business reputation. 0 1 The requirement of a
specific intent to injure competitors is designed to shield tests performed by
consumer groups from this kind of liability. As competition becomes keener as a
result of Taiwan's economic liberalization, product comparison has both offensive
and defensive strategies. Fair competition in providing comparative market and
product information as required by this provision is desirable and may be invoked
to determine the legality of comparative advertising, which has gained popularity
in Taiwan.
D. MULTILEVEL SALES
Multilevel sales can be a legitimate way of distributing consumer goods.
However, when the FTL was being drafted, illegal pyramid schemes that
resorted to fraud, misrepresentation, and undue pressure mushroomed. As a
result, the MOEA thought it necessary to control multilevel sales and criminalize
illegal pyramid schemes. The FTL now makes it an offense for anyone to
98. Id. art. 21.
99. As a result of a last-minute change in the draft FTL, no criminal liability will be imposed
on any person involved in such action. However, the FTC may also require retraction or correction.
Enforcement Rules, supra note 27, art. 25.
100. Case 81-Kung-Chu-O01, 1 FTC GAZETTE, no. 1, Feb. 29, 1992, at 3.
101. FTL art. 22.
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engage in a multilevel sales plan if participants receive commissions, monetary
rewards, or other economic benefits mainly by inducing others to join in the
plan, rather than from the marketing or sale of goods or services at reasonable
market prices.'02 In addition, the FTL authorizes the FTC to adopt Regulations
for the Control of Multilevel Sales. 1
03
E. OTHER METHODS OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
Following the model of section 5 of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission Act,
the FTL provides for a catchall rule against other methods of unfair competition.
Specifically, an enterprise may not conduct any deceptive or obviously unfair acts
that are sufficient to affect orderly functioning of the market.'°4 A violation
will not incur criminal liability. However, failure to comply with the FTC's
cease-and-desist order will lead to administrative fines. 105 What constitutes other
methods of unfair competition will require clarification on a case-by-case basis.
The FTC and courts in Taiwan may extrapolate from interpretations and case law
governing unconscionable conduct in article 74 of the Civil Code.
With reduced tariff rates and the substantial appreciation of the New Taiwan
dollar, import growth in Taiwan in recent years has been significant. Part of such
growth can be attributed to parallel importation of genuinely trademarked goods.
As courts in Taiwan are now less inclined to treat such importation as a violation
of the Trademark Law, the question of whether it could constitute a violation of
the FTL has drawn increased attention. In a recent interpretation the FTC recog-
nized that where an authorized distributor or locally licensed manufacturer is
already present, consumer goodwill can be created by local promotional cam-
paigns that may involve significant costs. A parallel importer may be found to
engage in unfair competition if it affirmatively misleads consumers, through
misrepresentation on the contents, source, contact name or address, or otherwise
that such goods are imported by the authorized distributor. By this interpretation
the FTC acknowledges that a "free ride" under such circumstances can constitute
a deceptive or obviously unfair act. 1
06
102. FTL art. 23(1). A violation can be punished for imprisonment up to three years and/or a
criminal fine of NT $1 million. Failure to comply with a cease-and-desist order of the FTC may lead
to an administrative fine of NT $50,000 to NT $500,000. The FTC may also require such plans to
dissolve or cease operations. Id. arts. 35, 42. A multilevel sale refers to a sales or marketing plan
or organization in which a participant pays certain consideration in exchange for acquiring the right
to sell or promote the sale of goods or services and the right to introduce other persons to join the
plan or organization, thereby obtaining a commission, monetary reward, or other economic benefit.
Id. art. 8.
103. FTL art. 23(2). These regulations require prior reporting with the FTC of such sales plans.
Organizers are required to provide detailed information to prospective participants and maintain books
and records at their principal place of business. Additionally, organizers may not impose certain terms
that may harm the interest of participants.
104. FTL art. 24.
105. FLT art. 41.
106. Interpretation Kun-Yen-003, 1 FTC GAZETTE, no. 4, May 31, 1992, at 6.
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H. Remedies and Enforcement
A. CIVIL REMEDIES
The FTL provides strong civil remedies to any person injured by any anticom-
petitive act or unfair methods of competition. Such a person may seek injunctive
relief. 107 This remedy is patterned after the relief for infringement of real property
rights'l8 and, as such, is desirable in controlling unfair market practices. The
FTL provisions prohibiting unfair competition indeed manifest a strong policy to
protect commercial goodwill, which is a form of property right. However, an
injunctive relief may not be appropriate for alleged violations of the antitrust rules
in the FTL. A "moral hazard" could be created if an astute enterprise wishes to
exploit this relief to obtain a prior restraint on the business conduct of its competi-
tors. This chilling effect is not conducive to maintaining a vibrant, competitive
economy. However, compensatory, after-the-fact relief should be sufficient.
Monetary damages may be awarded to a person injured by a violation of the
FTL.109 Whether plaintiffs need to show that damages are caused by intentional
harm is unclear, however. Some commentators, including legislators while re-
viewing the draft legislation, have adopted a literal interpretation and suggested
that strict liability will follow a violation of the FTL. In countries such as the
United States, however, antitrust violations are typically analyzed as an intentional
tort." 0 How causation will be analyzed also remains to be seen."' Following
a misappropriation theory, damages may be based on the illegal gains of the
defendant." 2 This principle is workable where there is unfair competition. How-
ever, calculating damages will be more complicated for different types of antitrust
violations. Whether the direct injury requirement in ROC damages law will lead
to a rule similar to the direct purchaser rule in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp. "' and Illinois Brick Co. v. State"4 remains to be seen. In the
case of joint defendants, whether contribution should be allowed will also be an
interesting issue. 115
107. FTL art. 30.
108. See Civil Code art. 767.
109. FTL art. 31.
110. RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND
OTHER MATERIALS 580 (2d ed. 1981).
111. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum, 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (maximum RPM not
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury).
112. FTL art. 32(2).
113. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
114. 431 U.S. 481 (1968) superseded by statute as stated in Union Carbide v. Superior Court, 679
P.2d 14 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1984).
115. From a policy perspective, such liability may be allocated on the basis of market shares.
Alternatively, contribution may be disallowed to create a deterrent for those engaging in anticompeti-
tive activities. While the FTL is silent on this issue, article 208 of the Civil Code suggests that, as
among joint defendants, damages should be shared equally.
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Under the FTL, actual damages may be trebled at the discretion of the court. 116
From the comparative law perspective, this discretionary treble damages relief
is most interesting. It is similar to the treble damages remedy in the U.S. Clayton
Act, section 4.117 However, it is not automatic and not necessarily treble. As a
form of punitive damages it deviates from the traditional civilian compensatory
(rather than deterrent) rationale for the recovery of damages for civil wrongs
prevailing in the ROC. 1 ' Unrecognized foreign legal persons and entities may
bring an action under the FTL if reciprocity exists.' 19 Therefore, this FTL provi-
sion would give equal standing to sue to foreign companies not qualified to do
business in the ROC.
120
B. ENFORCEMENT BY THE FTC
The FTC is organized as a commission with nine commissioners who, being
appointed by the president of the ROC with the recommendation of the premier,
serve a three-year term that may be renewed. Unlike other commissions or coun-
cils in the ROC, which for all practical purposes are controlled by the head of
the agency, the FTC functions in a way that is much closer to a truly independent
commission. It is required to function independently, and its commissioners must
have expertise in such areas as law, economics, or administration. 12' The chair
of the FTC, however, is considered a member of the cabinet, the Executive Yuan,
and the FTC is accountable to the Legislative Yuan. As the FTL is new to Taiwan,
the FTC is the only repository of expertise in the area of competition law. Judges
and prosecutors have yet to embark on any intensive educational program.
The FTC also wields substantial power. It is authorized to adopt the Enforce-
ment Rules that, according to the practice in Taiwan, will receive substantial
deference. Compared, for example, with the Merger Guidelines of the Federal
Trade Commission and Department of Justice of the United States, the Enforce-
ment Rules are more likely to be upheld in court. The FTC may also exercise
semijudicial power, such as the "administrative investigatory power." 122 To this
end the FTC may, under pain of administrative fines for failure to comply, compel
statements of facts and opinions from all interested parties, require production of
116. FTL art. 32(1).
117. Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)).
118. Id. art. 32. There is already an emerging trend to rely upon punitive damages in the ROC.
For example, the Securities and Exchange Law, as amended in 1988, now provides for treble damages
for insider trading in art. 157-1. A provision in the draft Consumer Protection Law also provides
for discretionary treble damages.
119. FTL art. 47.
120. This provision is similar to the enforcement provisions of the ROC's recently amended
intellectual property laws. See Patent Law art. 88-1; Trademark Law art. 62-1; and Copyright Law
art. 17.
121. FTL art. 28.
122. Id. art. 27.
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documents by others, and conduct on-site investigation. 123 As indicated above,
the FTC is also empowered to impose a substantial amount of administrative fines
and, under certain circumstances, structural relief. Striking the proper balance
between government policies such as trust-busting and investment promotion will
be a delicate task for the FTC.
C. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The FTC imposes criminal liability for many types of violations. While the
FTL bill stated that the antitrust rules were drafted to be much more lenient than
rules against unfair competition, actually the reverse has happened. 12 4 The FTL's
criminal sanctions could disrupt distribution arrangements. Under the criminal
jurisprudence of the ROC, corporations generally are considered not capable of
committing crimes. The FTL has modified that traditional rule. In addition, the
civil practice of acting as a "private attorney general" in the United States finds
a distant cousin in the private prosecution system in Taiwan. Taiwan's Code of
Criminal Procedure permits the direct victim of a crime to prosecute the offender
as if he was the government prosecutor. Although an effective enforcement tool,
the private prosecution rule, with its great potential for harassment, could also
turn the FTL on its head.
IV. Conclusion
A. EXERCISE IN LEGAL TRANSPLANT
While a bold attempt to extrapolate from abroad and transplant to Taiwan
antitrust and unfair competition principles, the FTL is still unlike its counterpart
in, for example, the United States, where a corpus of thousands of judicial prece-
dents offer much better guidance. Any codification attempt such as the FTL almost
guarantees that the resulting legislation has to be open-ended and yet all-inclusive
so that room for interpretation in the future remains. Such a legal transplant, once
engineered, will become a continuing enterprise as the FTC and the courts will
have to look to relevant foreign sources for continuing guidance on various issues
that will surface under the FTL. But competition laws are necessarily imbued
with ideologies, and the political economy of the governing law for the market-
place cannot easily be copied.
25
123. Id. art. 27.
124. An example in point is the limited deterrent for criminal misappropriation of trade secrets
in art. 19(5) because of the poor draftsmanship.
125. Cf Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L.Q. Rav. 76 (1976), in which he
argued, perhaps simplistically, that the key for a law reformer interested in legal transplants is to find
a transformable idea.
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B. THE "RULE OF REASON" APPROACH
The FTL bill was drafted with the intent to provide strong sanctions against
market cornering and unfair practices of competition. What is fair, however, is
often debatable, especially in a country like the ROC that is just beginning to
experiment with competition laws. With the exception of RPM arrangements, for
all practices that may have an anticompetitive effect, the "rule of reason" ap-
proach is adopted as a test of legality. The drafters hoped that this approach would
enable the FTC and the courts to consider the intent, effect, and reasonableness
of such practices in order to determine whether such practices should be permitted.
There are, however, costs to this approach. While the FTL retains flexibility
through this rule, it loses the certainty needed for compliance and guidance. This
uncertainty is further compounded by the breadth of the FTL.
C. IN THE NAME OF FAIR TRADE
What fundamental principles should influence legislation in the name of fair
trade? As far as the antitrust rules of the FTL are concerned, what is fair may
not be the right question to ask. Maximizing consumer welfare would suggest that
efficiency should be the predominant rule of the game. Law and economics are
both relevant to competition rules. Interestingly enough, academic lawyers in
Taiwan, who are often trained in Europe, are quite comfortable with the more
expansive, social-engineering role for the government. They tend to believe that
fairness should take precedence. Their colleagues in the economics profession,
most of whom are trained in the United States, offer a sharp contrast. 26 Students
of this dismal science in Taiwan are generally more concerned with government
failure than with market failure.
As the FTL becomes a permanent feature of the judicial edifice in Taiwan, the
fundamental question of how much benefit it can gain for a small, open-ended,
rapidly liberalizing and newly industrializing economy will be asked time and
again. 2 7 Likewise, one might ask: While unfair competition rules in the FTL
justify their legitimacy by complementing the traditional tort law, what proper
place is there for the FTL's antitrust rules as Taiwan rapidly integrates itself into
126. There is some current interest in the impact of different perceptions of political economy and
training on antitrust enforcement. See Thomas E. Kauper, Article 86, Excessive Prices and Refusal
to Deal, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 441 (1990); Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the
United States: Efficiency, Opportunity and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 981 (1986); Valentine
Korah, From Legal Form Toward Economic Efficiency-Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty in Contrast
to U.S. Antitrust, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 1009, 1020-21 n.1 (1990).
127. Michael E. Porter, for example, has advocated for rigorous enforcement of antitrust laws.
MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 662-64, 690 (1990). Note, how-
ever, that it took ten years to enact the FTL, during which time Taiwan has been transformed into
a vastly different economy.
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the global trading community?' 28 These questions are too important to be left to
regulators and judges alone. Companies, domestic and foreign, doing business
in Taiwan and their counsel should do well to ask these questions. Eventually,
they will become better prepared to deal with the new rules, as embodied in the
FTL, governing the marketplace.
128. A government official who has made a significant contribution to Taiwan's economic develop-
ment in the last forty years thinks that Taiwan does not need antitrust laws as long as it liberalizes
its economy. K.T. Li, supra note 5, at 141.
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